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Meeting of the Political Bureaux of the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU) 
and the European People's Party (EPP), held on 3 rd March 1981 in Brussels. 
Introduction : 
Kai-Uwe von Hassel 
FOREWORD 
In Autumn 1979 the question of future security was discussed with growing intensity in 
the countries of the free world. The reason was the warning issued by the leaders of the 
North Atlantic defence pact that, in the decade of detente, the Soviet Union had increas-
ed its arms potential to such an extent that the military balance between East and West 
had been lost, to the detriment of the West. 
The NATO leaders persisted in pointing out this situation and calling on the States of the 
North Atlantic defence pact to increase their efforts to maintain this balance. In this 
connection the United States, as the leading power in the western world, urged that the 
nuclear arsenal should also be brought up to.the level of that of the Soviet Union. 
The discussions in the western world did not follow these demands and sometimes 
produced notable divergencies. Left-wing socialists severely criticized these ideas. They 
were in some cases strongly supported by the media. The socialists and their supporters 
in the media emphasized, rather one-sidely, the priority of detente. They continually 
claimed that there was no alternative. The socialists did not, however, realize that by 
continually harping on the lack of alternatives they were convincing the opponents of the 
free world that the socialists in that free world were prepared to pay practically any price 
for detente. 
But doubts about the overall doctrine of the defence of the free world were also heard in 
the ranks of the non-socialists. Liberals of differing political weight took up the political 
ideas of the left-wing socialists. Even among Christian Democrats serious discussions 
were held, for the first time since the founding of NATO, on the possible revision of 
defence policy. 
Against this background the leadership of the ECDU and the EPP decided to take up the 
theme of ,,Defence and Security Policy", and designated a defence committee from the 
two bodies to prepare a policy debate. 
From Autumn 1979 until now, i.e., in just 11/2 years, this committee has met seven times. It 
had undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the world situation and consequently 
drawn up a paper which forms the basis of today's discussion. 
In the light of developments since Autumn 1979, i.e., since the invasion of Afghanistan, 
the taking of the hostages in Teheran, the military conflict in the Middle East between 
Iran and Iraq, the developments in various African countries, the second oil crisis and the 
threat to oil and raw material supply routes to the western world, this paper has been 
frequently redrafted and new material added. 
At the meetings the defence corn mittee had before it a number of papers from our Dutch, 
Belgian and French colleagues. Also included in the deliberations were the papers 
prepared by the Western European Union-the parliamentary assembly of the Brussels 
pact responsible for questions of security and defence, whose report on the issue of the 
,,Future of European Security" was adopted on 2 December 1980. 
An initial discussion had also been taking place during this same period in the European 
Parliament. The EPP Group believes that these questions must also be given serious 
consideration in the directly-elected European Parliament. This Parliament must extend 
its responsibility to cover questions of security policy and armaments. The defence 
working party of the Group has drawn up a number of working papers which are being 
discussed there at the moment and which have also been drawn on for our discussions. 
All these papers have thus been taken as the basis for the deliberations on our proposal. 
It hardly needs to be said that there can never have been a paper which succeeded in 
including all the views of all the partners. 
The paper before us is therefore a compromise, although no party has had to make major 
concessions on any point. All the members of the committee accepted the draft without 
reservation. However, I assume that various provision,s will have to be discussed today. I 
would also point out that the chairman of our Irish member party indicated at an early 
stage that this party could not take part in this debate because of his country's special 
role, and that it would be adstaining in the voting on the resolution. Everyone in our 
gathering will respect this special role. 
I. Our work has made it clear enough that the situation is grim and that the world is 
overshadowed by the threatening destruction of freedom. The forces which could and 
should be working against this trend are lost in clouds and fancies, and are unable or 
unwilling to study the real facts if they do not fit in with their picture of the world. Some of 
them are not even willing to employ adequate means for the situation. 
But there is not a single analysis drawn up by the scientific and military staffs of the free 
world which does not give dramatic and depressing figures for the military strength of 
the Soviet Union. They specify that the Soviet forces are not on~y the most numerous, 
they are also the most modern, at full war strength, mobile and extremely efficient. They 
are fully standardised : a division of the so-called People's Army of the GDR can draw 
spare parts from any Polish, Czech or Russian stores: they have standardised weapons, 
vehicles, equipment, ammunition and fuels. 
On the demarcation line between free and unfree Europe the Soviet armies are lined up 
en masse and armed ready to attack. Together with them are the units of the states of the 
Warsaw pact. Vis-a-vis the Federal Republic of Germany they have increased their land 
forces by a million men, their tank strength by 40% and their artillery by as much as 
100%. The operational bases of the eastern bloc air forces al ready have their third 
generation of post-war aircraft; in the west we still rely on the second generation. 
The Soviet armies are offensive armies : they would only need a fraction of their forces 
for defence. And against whom would the Soviet Union have to defend itself in the west? 
Against the possibility of attack from NATO? 
NATO is a defence alliance and everyone in the know - and I assume that Russian 
generals and politicians are in the know- realizes that NATO is totally unsuitable for 
carrying out attacks. But there are stil I people in the west who believe Soviet propaganda 
and even spread the idea that the Soviet Union must feel itself under military threat from 
the west. 
In the last 24 months I have had occasion enough to make it clear that the Soviet Union is 
today in a position to achieve any military objective which it wishes to set itself: 
it can cross any border ; 
- it can reach to any part of the world and sail undisturbed on the seven seas; 
- it can locate its intercontinental weapons anywhere in the universe. 
No-one is maintaining that the Soviets want a war today. They would have the capability 
many times over. 
Now their intentions are certainly directed towards peace. However, we should base our 
measures not on the intentions of the moment but only on the capabilities of the other 
side : intentions can change overnight-if, for instance, there is a change in the Kremlin 
leadership. 
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It is a tragic thing for the western world that very few politicians grasp these key facts and 
base their policies on them. There are dreams of peaceful intentions, of Willy Brandt's 
claim that peace has become more certain. Nothing is more absurd, but no catchphrase 
is unfortunately so effective and popular as this claim that peace has become more 
certain. 
The great Christian Democrats of the post-war period have always given prominence to 
the questions of threat and security, the need for defence and the need to form broad 
alliances in their speeches and political actions. We have often had too much of it - it 
would be wrong to deny the fact - but how right they were : only under the shield of 
security can internal policy - social order, the family, the economy and cultural and 
intellectual life - thrive. 
There were times in the sixties and seventies when it was thought that greater attention 
should be given to internal policy. Indeed internal policy is very important, but given 
world developments we must admit that even we Christian Democrats have not given 
enough thought to the world and its threats and the need to protect freedom. In the grass 
roots of our party people believed that ,,those at the top" would take care of things, as 
they had made a brilliant success of things before and that is was enough to tell them to 
do what was necessary. Even our parties have in some cases dangerously neglected 
foreign policy and have become too provincialist. 
I told you that against this background the ECDU and EPP have decided to reexamine 
the question of security and defence policy anew. The word ,,anew" is not quite correct. 
In the four years of its existence the EPP has not yet looked at this component of our 
policy- except for general remarks: the ECDU has not discussed this subject for more 
than ten years. So this debate today is the first major fundamental debate on the subject. 
In its discussion the committee feels that it must make the party and its supporters aware 
of what is at stake. It is my view that not enough emphasis can be given to the dangers 
imminent in the world today. 
It was emphasized in the discussions that detente is something we actively desire. In the 
same breath, however, it is stated that detente must not be at the cost of our freedom. We 
believe that dreams and fancies will not make the world more secure. We have made it 
clear that we do not want war and those that maintain we do are abetting aggressive 
world communism. 
We have summed up our aims as follows : 
- clarity in our objectives - namely maintaining peace ; 
- firmness in our policy to this end; 
unanimity in our alliance ; 
- solidarity of the free peoples of the worle. 
I said earlier that Christian Democrats support the policy of detente in their programme 
and have always warned against false hopes in the past. The Soviet invasion of Afghanis-
tan, against which we protested energetically, demonstrates that the forces of the Soviet 
Union are in no way defensive but are employed world wide in the service of Kremlin 
policy. This act of aggression beyond the borders of previous Communist influence has 
gone beyond the limits of the Warsaw Pact. In our view this influence has spread to a 
horrific extent. The dangers it brings are ever-increasing. This also affects the countries 
of the Third World to the same extent. A quick look at the map of Africa, for instance, 
should demonstrate to anybody what is happening and what dangerous developments 
are taking place for Europe: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Dahomey and Guinea-
Bissau. And in the last few months Libya, a close ally of the Soviet Union, has practically 
absorbed Chad. And this country is next to Niger, one of the major sources of uranium. 
Europe is confronted with the task of making the countries of the Third World aware of 
this new world-wide challenge from the Soviet Union. The Third World is also crucially 
dependent on world-wide guaranteed security and freedom ; it also depends on guaran-
teed sea communications for oil and raw materials. 
A constantly recurring note in our discussions has been the fact that we face difficult 
decisions. There must be no division of labour in which the United States takes on the 
burden of providing security while the Europeans adopt priority for the policy of detente. 
This would be a grave danger for the Atlantic Alliance. 
We uphold the need for disarmament negotiations with the east, designed to provide 
practical solutions rather than just gaining time. We are,not responsible for the delays. 
For us it is essential to cooperate in the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid and to 
ensure the continuation of the arms control negotiations. 
Allow me to conclude whith four further observations. 
FIRSTLY 
Some of our partners here are unable to express their views on the Alliance for under-
standable reasons : I mentioned our Irish friends. The freedom of these partners is 
however closely bound up with our own freedom. Their freedom will also come to nought 
if we cannot maintain ours. 
SECONDLY 
We should all remember the lessons of the Second World War and the consequent 
commitments we made to preserve security in freedom. This task has al sways been to the 
fore in our policies: we have had to demand many unpopular measures in order to 
preserve this freedom. 
You will agree with me that there is no other European grouping which has so unequivo-
cally supported the cause of the preservation of freedom during the last thirty years as 
the Christian Democrats. They have, essentially, been the ones to foster the idea of the 
defence of freedom, as they still are today. Without our firm attitude the Alliance would 
no longer exist today. 
THIRDLY 
Everything indicates that the up-and-coming generation of socialists of all kinds is well 
on the way to eradicating the readiness and will for defence. The latest events in 
connection with the consideration of the 1981 budget in the German Bundestag offer 
enough proof of this. If these young left-wingers are allowed to do as they wish they will 
one day destroy all our efforts in the Alliance in order to attain their ultimate dream of the 
unification of the working class in accordance with their motto ,,Workers of the world, 
unite". And I do not need to say who will then give the lead. The young socialist 
generation of today will break the Alliance tomorrow. I exhort you to take this warning 
seriously. If we fail to understand this we shall be guilty of neglecting a crucial sector of 
our policy. 
FOURTHLY 
Careful observers of the situation in our countries realise that the danger lies not only in 
developments in the socialist camp but also far beyond that. The younger generation is 
very susceptible to pacifist tones; in my own evangelical church we have pacifist 
theologians who agitate against the will for self-defence in fine-sounding phrases but 
without any knowledge of the facts. 
7 
8 
Anyone who cares to dig deeper will discover a grand Soviet strategy to undermine the 
will to defend of the west in many ways, with many variations, persons and organisations. 
The terrible danger must be understood by everyone. We in the west are faced with the 
question of whether we can make our people understand what is at stake. It is widely 
thought that the danger can be kept at bay by concessions in the hope that the other side 
will see reason and make a similar contribution. Those who support these ideas are 
unfortunately ignorant of the historical development of world communism. 
It you have studied the draft decision which was forwarded to you in good time you will 
know that our objective runs through our paper like a leitmotif: we also want detenteand 
disarmament, confrontation is not our objective. But the paper also tries to counter the 
illusions which so many people have espoused in recent years. The committee feels an 
obligation to point out in no uncertain terms what we have to do. 
The Political Bureaux of the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU) and the 
European People's Party (EPP), at their joint meeting held on 3 March 1981 in Brussels 
under the chairmanship of Kai-Uwe von Hassel and Leo Tindemans unanimously adop-
ted the following resolution. In view of Ireland's special status, the Irish delegation 
abstained. 
Resolution 
on security and 
defence policy 
1. The political parties forming the EPP and the ECDU are conscious that they must 
make a real contribution to world peace in freedom. They note with satisfaction that the 
Atlantic Alliance and the establishment of the European Community have ensured thirty 
years of peace in freedom and fruitful cooperation between nations that were formerly 
rivals. 
Given that peac~ and liberty are inseparable, one of their main aims is to safeguard and 
further the cause of peace. This involves more than the prevention of war or armed 
conflict. It requires just as well initiatives to lessen existing tensions and, wherever 
possible, to achieve peaceful solutions. The principal aim is therefore general, progres-
sive and controlled disarmament. This also means active promotion of just world rela-
tions. In terms of European development the latter means : 
- striving towards a society where everyone can lead a meaningful existence and is 
offered an equal chance to develop his potential ; where young people see prospects for 
the future and minorities are treated with respect; 
- the establishment of an international legal order characterized by just international 
relations, inter alia at social and economic level, and where human rights are important. 
The best guarantee of this is a democratic pluralist system : 
- the pursuit, as equals, of a policy of development cooperation with the Third World in 
which fundamental social rights and solidarity are given a global perspective. 
2. Confident in the future of the peaceful relations, which assure the safety of the 
European peoples within the European Community, confident in the friendship linking 
them with the United States and Canadian peoples, the christian democratic parties 
express their concern at the constant advance of Soviet expansionism throughout the 
world, of which the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the brutal occupation 
of that country by Soviet troops for over a year now, in the face of the united resistance of 
the Afghan people, has been a recent example. 
The increasing nuclear and conventional strength of the Soviet armed forces, their 
increasing presence throughout the oceans of the world, which is a direct threat to 
European supplies, their direct or indirect intervention in Central Asia, Africa, the Middle 
East, Southern Asia and the Caribbean cannot be justified as legitimate concern for 
security. 
These are the manifestations of an offensive world strategy calculated to rollback the 
positions of the West and undermine the independence of Third World countries wher-
ever the USSR thinks vulnerable, with a view to the final victory of a political and 
economic system based on totalitarianism and alleged communist supremacy. 
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The obvious imbalance of power in Europe which is now developing is a major threat to 
that continent, since the Soviet Union has achieved strategic nuclear parity with the USA, 
and is now threatening the very heart of that country. It is also building up nuclear 
superiority in the European theatre. Its MIRVed, mobile, and highly accurate SS 20s and 
its Backfire bomber will soon enable the USSR to pose a first-strike threat to all military 
targets in Western Europe. 
The Warsaw Pact has a clear superiority over the Atlantic Alliance in Europe in conven-
tional weapons, which in some areas is higher than 2:1, even though this is partially 
offset by a Western superiority in tactical nuclear weapons. 
3. Western Europe remains the permanent target for Soviet expansion which aims at 
exercising control over a group of countries grouping together substantial technologi-
cal, industrial and agricultural resources. To this end, the Soviet Union will work to 
enfeeble the links between the European countries within the European Community, and 
between the latter and the United States. The EPP and ECDU wish to make it known that 
all attempts to weaken western solidarity as enshrined in the Atlantic Alliance will be 
denounced and resisted with vigour. European security requires that the Alliance uniting 
the free people of Europe and North America be maintained and strengthened. There will 
be more likelihood of the American commitment to the security being continued in the 
long-term if the Europeans themselves demonstrate their determination to take suffi-
ciently large a part in their own defence. 
The EPP and ECDU are aware of the subversive and ideological aspects of the threat. The 
Soviet Union, interpreting detente to its own advantage, is conducting a part overt, part 
undercover, political campaign to weaken, divide and demoralise the potential adver-
sary. 
Detente is no substitute for defence. It can supplement it where it does not upset the vital 
balance of power. Detente is beneficial if it represents a joint effort to reduce tension, 
defuse crises, and give form to coexistence and cooperation. It must not be used by the 
communist camp as a smoke screen behind which huge stocks of arms are built up. 
Neutrality in the West will not serve genuine detente. 
4. As the world's most important trading unit, composed of countries which, in spite of 
the international economic recession, offer their citizens the highest standard of living, 
the European Community makes an important contribution to Western security. The 
yearly increase in defence budgets, the recent decision to modernize and strengthen the 
British and French nuclear deterrents, the modernization and deployment of nuclear 
medium-range arms - Pershing II missiles and Cruise missiles - decided by the Al-
liance and accompanied by an offer of negotiations to end the arms race, all demonstrate 
Europe's desire to play an active role in its defence. 
Deterrence requires a scafe of reactions to all forms and levels of aggression, before 
extreme measures are resorted to. Flexible response appears to be the most reasonable 
solution. 
But European security cannot be maintained simply by strengthening her defence 
capability. To win the peace, we must stamp out the seeds of war. 
Being convinced that world peace is inseparable from international justice, respect for 
human rights and the fair distribution of wealth, the EPP and ECDU believe that Europe 
must pursue a bold policy of cooperation with the Third World, with the aim of making 
the most effective contribution to the development of the poorest regions of the world, 
and protecting them from the destabilization campaigns mounted by the USSR and its 
allies. 
5. The EPP and ECDU regard the accession of Greece and soon of Spain and Portugal 
to the Community a.s likely to strengthen pluralist democracy and increase stability in 
regions of major strategic value to the defence of Europe. If Spain declares itself in 
favour of accession to the Atlantic Alliance, the EPP and ECDU will support this move. 
The EPP and ECDU underline the importance of politial initiatives, such as the Euro/Arab 
Dialogue and the North/South Dialogue which can introduce more stab ii ity to the Medi-
terranean. It recalls that a sufficient naval presence from the United States and European 
countries to protect the vital lines of communication between the Middle East and 
Europe is an important element in the maintenance of our security. 
6. The EPP and ECDU feel that the time has come for an 'entire reappraisal of the 
concept and the structure of the Atlantic Alliance with a view to adapting and streng-
thening it. 
The aim is to consolidate the ,,European pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance which would, far 
from dividing it, increase the cohesion of the West by putting relations between the 
United States and a Europe in the course of unification on a footing of equal partnership. 
Europe must assume its rightful role of responsibility within the field of international 
politics. It will command more attention once it establishes a sense of cohesion and 
speaks with a single voice. Solidarity does not mean playing follow my leader but 
consultation and coordination between free partners. Now that America has reinforced 
its world strategy, Europe, for its part, must assert its identity and interests in formulating 
a joint strategy. The time has come for European concertation within the Atlantic 
Alliance. Better European concertation is impossible without progress towards Euro-
pean political unification. 
7. The EPP and ECDU feel that fresh impetus is desirable for the negotiations on arms 
control and disarmament, and on monitoring of armaments. They regard it as particu-
larly desirable that the MBFR negotiations should show results. 
They support the proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe to cover, in an 
initial stage, the extension and strengthening of measures designed to build up confi-
dence. Their aim is to achieve and be able to verify a balanced, definite and binding 
reduction of conventional armed forces throughout Europe and as far as the Urals. 
They hope that the negotiations proposed by NATO on the limitation of nuclear 
medium-range arms wil I be set in motion so that a balance in this field can be restored in 
Europe at as low a level as possible. 
They believe that the SALT negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms should be 
resumed. 
They are deeply concerned at the spread of the arms trade and the dangers of increased 
quantities of nuclear arms in the world. They support te Danish initiative to examine 
within the UNO the problems of the arms trade. 
8. In the spirit of the report by Mr Kai-Uwe von Hassel on behalf of the Political 
Committee of the Western European Union, the EPP and ECDU consider that the 
European Parliament, the only European assembly with the cachet of election by direct 
universal suffrage, would be shirking its responsibility for expressing the concern of its 
electors if it did not discuss matters relating to European security. Therefore they 
support the proposals to send Members of the European Parliament to take part as 
observers in the work of the WEU Assembly. 
They consider that the European members of the Alliance must strengthen their defence 
coordination so that Europe makes the most suitable contribution to the alliance and a 
better balanced one in relation to the United States. Increased standardization and 
inter-operability between the various national forces is very important. 
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They also believe that genuine European cooperation should be achieved on arma-
ments. They are convinced that such developments would strengthen the Alliance by 
restoring the necessary balance, but that they should not lead to an increase in arms 
exports. 
The EPP and ECDU feel that the recent progress in European political cooperation (EPC) 
justifies the establishment of a joint foreign policy decision-making centre to provide 
continuity for European diplomacy between the meetings of the European Council and 
the Council of Foreign Ministers. 
This joint centre, which is accountable to the European Council, should also concern 
itself with the study of problems connected with security. If necessary, the European 
Council may invite other European countries which are not members of the Community 
to take part in mutual consultations on security and defence. 
9. The capacity and quality of the defence of the Atlantic Alliance must fulfil four 
fundamental requirements : 
- it must always be sufficient to deter aggression or unreasonable political pressures 
and, if necessary, to keep conflict to as low a level as possible; 
- it must be characterized by restraint to the extent that an arms race is avoided ; 
- it must have as its aim arms control and disarmament, particularly as regards nuclear 
weapons, to take place within the framework of a general disarmament policy ; 
- it must be directed towards maintaining the strategic unity of Atlantic Alliance 
territory, with the twofold aim of developing its ,,European pillar" and extending the 
security relationship between Western Europe and the United States, both of which 
aspects are necessary to maintain security in the two areas. 
If Europe is to regain its influence in the world and make a decisive contribution to 
balance and peace, in particular by becoming one of the most important partners of the 
Third World, it must be able to provide a deterrent to Soviet expansionism. Only by 
strengthening its links with the United States, while implementing and coordinating an 
adequate armament effort, can it retain its credibility and regain its self-confidence, 
without which it runs the risk of sur.cumbing to defeatism or the illusion of an ephemeral 
neutrality. 
The Christian Democrats are convinced that it is the psychological and cultural forces of 
our world rather than the material ones which will play a decisive role, and they therefore 
reiterate their determination to establish a free and just society based on Christian 
principles; the repercussions of such a society will prove a pattern for those peoples 
subjected to totalitarian regimes on which they can model themselves and which can 
encourage efforts to make transformations within these regimes. 
EUROPEAN 
MONETARY 
UNIFICATION 
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The Political Bureau of the European People's Party (EPP), meeting in Brussels on 
28 April 1981 under the chairmanship of Leo Tindemans, unanimously adopted the 
following resolution : 
RESOLUTION on measures to be taken 
in the monetary field 
with a view to 
EUROPEAN 
MONETARY UNIFICATION 
PREAMBLE 
The Community, as indeed each of the Member States, is faced with one of the most 
serious crises Europe has ever experienced. The technological revolution, the energy 
crisis, competition from numerous newly-industrialized non-member countries, the 
increased poverty and indebtedness of the ,,Fourth World", radical uncontrolled disor-
der in international monetary relations; all these factors are combining to create intract-
able disequilibria with regard to inflation, industrial structures and employment. 
The European Community must face up to these difficulties by coordinating its efforts 
and defining an overall strategy based on harmonious national policies and suitable 
Community machinery. 
The position of the Community as the world's leading commercial power confers upon it 
certain responsabilities with a view to the restoration of financial equilibria in the world, 
the gradual introduction of a new international monetary system and the financing of 
economic development in Europe an the Third World. 
The strengthening of the European Monetary System should therefore go beyond the 
institution of a Community integrating mechanism to meet the need for closer conver-
gence of the economies of the member countries. It should be the focal point of a global 
strategy designed to provide a gradual restoration of balance in the operation of world 
economy and to give a new impetus to economic growth in Europe. 
The Political Bureau of the European People's Party (EPP) : 
- having regard to the tradition of consultation between the central banks of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), which dates back to the Council Decisions of 
8 May 1964 (64/300/EEC) setting up a Committee of the Governors of the Central Banks of 
the Member States and imposing an obligation to hold consultations within the Mone-
tary Committee (64/301/EEC); 
- having regard to the resolution of the Council and the representatives of the go-
vernments of the Member States of 22 March 1971 concerning the gradual implementa-
tion of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community; 
- whereas such a development will not be possible unless the Member States of the 
Community reaffirm their desire to bring about European Political Union, and this results 
in the near future in the adoption of Community measures to promote economic harmo-
nization and convergence ; 
- whereas the resolution of 22 March 1971 has not been put into effect asa result of the 
disruptions both in the operation of the world economy and in international monetary 
relations; moreover there has not been enough enthusiasm on the part of the European 
Community. However, the Member States are nevertheless striving unremittingly to 
achieve the alignment and coordination of the European currencies, chiefly in relation to 
other currencies, to the extent that certain important points of the Werner Report are 
being applied, such as the virtually permanent consultations between the central banks 
through their private telephone conference networks; 
- whereas these efforts, aimed at establishing a zone of stability in Europe, led to the 
creation of the European Monetary System (EMS), set up by the European Council 
resolution of 5 December 1978 and effectively implemented by the central banks of the 
Membres States on 13 March 1979 ; 
- whereas in paragraph 1.4 of its resolution on the EMS the European Council states 
that it remains ,,firmly resolved to consolidate, not later than two years after the start of 
the scheme, into a final system the provisions and procedures thus created. This system 
will entail the creation of the European Monetary Fund as announced in the conclusions 
of the European Council meeting in Bremen on 6 and 7 July 1978, as well as the full 
utilization of the ECU as a reserve asset and a means of settlement. It will be based on 
adequate legislation at the Community as well as the national level" ; 
- having regard to the adoption by the European Parliament on 17 April 1980 of the 
resolution presented by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (Doc 1-63/80) 
on the European Monetary System (EMS), and to the fears expressed in the conclusions 
of the explanatory statement (paragraph 86): ,,There is therefore a strong likelihood 
that, when the deadline arrives, the Community will once again find itself unprepared" 
and that these fears have so far proved to be justified ; 
- whereas during this two-year period, despite the oil price explosion, the reversal in 
the balance of payments situation and the considerable instability of the dollar and the 
yen, the EMS has facilitated greater stability in international currency exchange rates in 
Europe, as a result of the coordination of national policies on interest rates and interven-
tion in Community currencies; 
- whereas, because of the difficulties connected with abandoning sovereign rights 
such as the minting of money, the introduction of a European currency into circulation in 
the Member States is a process which can only be achieved by stages; 
- whereas during this two-year period in which the EMS has yielded favourable re-
sults - apart from the minor adjustments in September and November 1979 - the 
central rates have been maintained and the 2.25% fluctuation margins between the 
Community currencies have been minimal in comparison with the substantial disparities 
between the principal economic indicators in the Member States, that is : differences in 
the rates of inflation from 3 to 21 %, in the budget deficit from 1 to 12% of GDP, in average 
working hours from 37 to 42 hours a week, in the unemployment rate from 3 to 11 %of the 
working population, in the interest rate (3 month interbank rate) from 3 to 32% and in the 
balance of payments deficit from Oto 9% of GDP, these differences being such that a 
fixed relationship between the Community currencies would probably not have altered 
significantly the need for shortterm support and credit ; (1) 
- whereas it is aware that the favourable results achieved over the two-year period, 
which has come to an end, call for the Bremen resolution to be implemented in a 
permanent and practical manner, particularly since the objective of achieving stability in 
Europe will not be guaranteed until certain irrevocable decisions have been taken ; 
- having regard to the need expressed by the European Council at Bremen on 5 De-
cember 1978, within the framework of a vast strategy to improve economic development, 
to try to intensify convergence of the Member States' economic policies; 
1. requests that the Council, in pursuance of the decisions made by the European 
Council in Bremen, should immediately create the political conditions for the introduc-
(1) See page 24. 15 
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tion at European tevel of a central independent monetary authority (European Monetary 
Fund}, to which the necessary gotd and currency reserves would be transferred; 
2. invites the European institutions to take alt the necessary measures to create a 
European currency, and requests them to take the immediate step of strengthening the 
rote of the ECU as a reserve currency and means of settlement, between commercial 
banks as well as between the central banks ; 
3. requests that the European institutions take political initiatives at the same time in 
ordertoattai,ngen,utne corwerg.ence of the economic, and especially budgetary, policies 
of the member countries, without neglecting the back-up measures needed to reduce 
the stwcturat imbalances in various sectors of the economy. 
• 
ExfManatory Statement 
Rapporteur : John PouHet 
The Economic Affairs Committee of the ECDU and the EPP has spent several meetings 
debating what should be its position with regard to the introduction of the European 
Monetary System. 
The committee has therefofe been at pains to appraise the importance and effect of the 
EMS in terms of ,,whether or not it constitutes a decisive step towards the accomplish-
ment of Economic and Monetary Union and, therefore, towards European Union" (1). 
The analysis of this appraisal comprises three parts. The first part will deal with the 
political aspects and the technical aspects ; the second part will assess the EMS from the 
point of view of its operation after two years ; the third part will explain th-e ,recom-
men{lations for a strengthening of tne EMS 1ead-ing to monetary unification. 
1. ANAL VSIS OF THE EMS 
1.1. Political aspects 
1.1.1. Reasons for the creation of the EMS 
No reference was made to the motives either in Bremen or in Brussels on 5 December 
1978. 
However, economists and techn ica~ ,experts cOflsider that there are two basic reasons 
behind the creation of the EMS. 
The first motive lies in the fact that it is symptomatic of the situation that the Europeans 
should have been driven to resort toOfle of the techniques of unification more asa result 
of their displeasure at the American policy of using the dollar as an +nstmment of 
competition in trade than for domestk reasons (2). 
The decision was not based on any of the specific and deliberate proposals put forward 
by various statesmen, as poif1ted out by Mr Werner, in connection with the plan wruch 
bears his name, in his speech on 15December 1980 to the Centre d'Accewl pour 
!'Europe Unie : ,,The reasons for the failure am varied, but they are all ,rooted 4n an 
indisputable weakening of political wtll". One after another, the reports of Mr Werner, 
Mr Marjolin, Mr Spierenburg, Mr Jefffiins and Mr Tindemans were ignored Of re001ved 
with scepticism. Action would seem to have been inspired only by fear. 
It is no less symptomatic that hardly had the USA taken measures to strengthen and 
stabilize the dollar (measures which were at last effective) than the Europeans~oun-
tered great difficulties in putting th-e EMS into operatioo, ostensibly because of the 
problem of Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs). 
The second motive lies in the realization that the floating of currencies against one 
another does not lead to an improvement in the competitiveness of economies and, 
consequently, in trade balances (3) (4). On the contrary, countries such as Italy, the 
United Kingdom, the USA and, to a lesser extent, France, which left the snake in 1974, did 
not see any improvement in their competitive position despite the continuous deprecia-
tion in their respective currencies. 
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It was therefore assumed that Italy and the United Kingdom would agree to return to a 
stable exchange system similar to that of Bretton Woods or the parity grid resulting from 
the setting of stable yet adjustable bilateral pivot rates referred to as the ,,snake". 
Politically, it was inconceivable that these countries could purely and simply rejoin the 
snake, because to do so would have been tantamount to publicly admitting that the 
whole policy of the last seven years had been wrong. 
Another solution, superficially different from the snake, had to be found, whence the 
birth of the EMS. 
1.1.2. Following its analysis of motivations, the Committee undertakes a political 
analysis. , 
One cannot fail to notice how differently the EMS is assessed in the speeches of 
politicians with responsibilities in this field and in the writings of technical experts -
mainly represented by the central banks. Although it was the latter who carried out the 
work requested by the governments, it is in fact government circles that appear more 
satisfied with the experts' work than are the experts themselves. Car manufacturers 
know perfectly well that their products will not withstand the strain of being driven by 
unorthodox drivers. 
One has the impression that politicians think they can solve political problems by simply 
relying on technology. It was thus that in Bremen the general technical outline of the 
EMS was decided on by the governments on the basis of political data. It would have 
been better to specify the political framework and to ask the technical experts to submit 
various technical solutions, say two or three alternatives and to specify the economic 
and monetary conditions to be fulfilled in order to give each alternative a reasonable 
chance of success, in which case the governments would have had to choose the 
politically most feasible solution and then stick to it. As the National Bank of Belgium 
states in its annual report for the 1978 financial year (5), this remains the chief problem. 
Now that the EMS has been decided on, it is necessary to consider what its political 
impact will be. 
It was to be feared that the inauguration of the EMS would be delayed because of the 
question of Monetary Compensatory Amounts. Thus, betraying a narrow-minded natio-
nalism (6). Such a decision could not have been taken before all the technical aspects 
had been smoothed out. 
Although each of the governments involved is right in its own way, it is to be hoped that 
both sides will make an effort to solve the technical gaps caused by the MCAs, failing 
which we could be faced with renewed indecision at the end of the two-year transitional 
period. This was a political victory. 
Lastly, although the EMS has finally got off the ground, it is possible to view its later 
political scope as being a contribution of sufficient impact to open up the way to future 
progress towards economic and monetary union and, therefore, to political union. 
Indeed, no country can foretell what socio-economic problems it will be faced with 
between now and 1985 given the persistently high level of unemployment, especially in 
view of the fact that public reactions vary greatly between the Latin, Germanic and 
English-speaking countries. These reactions threaten to force some governments to 
take protectionist measures incompatible with the EMS and the Treaty of Rome if 
the political will does not clearly demonstrate its desire to consolidate the progress 
achieved. 
When social tension unsettles the economy of a country, that country will tend to 
withdraw from a common system as long as it is technically possible, which is true of the 
EMS. 
It is therefore logical that the following question should be asked : if there is a genuine 
political will to achieve economic and monetary union, why not decide immediately on 
the creation of a European currency, since such a·step is technically and economically 
possible? 
It has been observed that the main parameters of the economies-VAT, working hours, 
taxation, hourly wage rates, inflation rates, interest rates, etc ... -show wider gaps than 
the 2.25% bilateral fluctuation brackets around the pivot rates. 
Consequently, the straightforward scrapping of these fluctuation brackets is marginally 
the least important of all the parameters distinguishing the economies. 
1.2. From the technica.1 point of view, the EMS has both strong and weak points. 
1.2. 1. The main qualities of the EMS can be summed up as follows : as improvement on 
Bretton Woods and on the snake, an improvement of the mutual support instruments 
and, above all, the fact that it appears politically feasible. 
More specifically, in contrast to Bretton Woods, the European currencies are expressed 
in terms of a reference unit based on the European currencies themselves, rather than in 
terms of gold or the dollar. The technical conditions remain unchanged - 2.25% 
fluctuation margin (except temporarily in the case of the lira, where it is 6%) instead of 
1 %- and, where the settlement of balances is concerned, the use of the ECU for 50% of 
balances instead of dollars or gold for 100% of balances. This will have a considerable 
restraining effect on the practice of printing dollars as an unconditional method of 
financing the American balance of payments deficit, a practice which, although not an 
intended part of the Bretton Woods system, had arisen as a result of the management of 
the American economy since 1944, with all its detrimental effects on other economies, 
and of the monopolistic position of the US dollar on the exchange market 
Compared to the snake, the EMS offers the advantage of a better balancing of tensions 
between economies showing divergent trends. In fact, the aforesaid Common Market 
countries had the choice of rejoining the DM zone, which allows for more growth in a 
period of recession, but at the same time applying a deflationary policy, or of veering 
away from the DM zone, leaving the snake and continuing to apply an inflationary policy. 
Where the means of support are concerned, there is an unquestionable improvement to 
be noted as regards both volume and terms. Very short-term support, which is unlimited 
in volume, is now available for 45 days rather than 30. The aim of this measure is to 
provide a better technical means of coping with those erratic movements on the ex-
change markets which are fundamentally unjustified from the economic and monetary 
points of view. 
The time limit for short-term support has been raised from 6 to 9 months, which is still too 
short because it should at least have been raised to the budgetary year. Evidently, the 
mutual distrust between the proponents of an orthodox policy and the others is such that 
the former are not prepared to make an effort - excessive credit is another word for 
inflation - unless they perceive the same willingness amongst their partners. 
1.2.2. The weaknesses of the EMS stem mainly from the divergencies in economic 
policies, any lack of credibility of the ECU as a reserve currency and the fragmentary 
nature of the exchange market 
The EMS is no more than a technique designed to create a standard currency to be used 
by European countries, but it is threatened with the same fate as other projects such as 
the once envisaged EDC (European Defence Community), the standardization of VAT 
rates, Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs), etc ... , in short, all the techniques on 
which Europe fails to agree or scuttles when there is no agreement on a standard policy. 
19 
20 
Thus the pattern of the inflation rate has a direct effect on the purchasing power of the 
standard currency. There can be no question of maintaining a European currency unit if 
the inflation trends diverge too greatly. Clearly, the EMS basket permits of devaluations 
or revaluations, but as soon as balances of payments begin to be settled in ECU, a 
decision by a given country to devalue its currency would be unwelcome because the 
other countries would be obliged to revalue their currencies and would thus receive less 
national currency than they had originally lent. After all, the aim of a standard currency is 
always to receive the same purchasing power in return for what has been lent, which 
would not be the case. 
Failure to harmonize VAT rates will mean that the 2.25% bracket for fluctuations between 
bilateral rates, being far less than the differences between VAT rates, will not last long 
unless stringent frontier checks are carried out, which is contrary to the principle of the 
free movement of goods. Major distortions on certain markets between the Netherlands 
and Belgium, which are no longer separated by a frontier, will not last long. 
Failure to harmonize taxation rates will mean that the 2.25% bracket for fluctuations 
between bilateral rates will not last long because the pressure in the frontier regions will 
be too strong. 
Lastly, the problem of common agricultural prices provides tangible proof of the preca-
riousness of a technique when economic and monetary orthodoxy is not observed. From 
a technical point of view, it was a serious mistake to link the solution for agricultural 
prices to exchange rates because this meant measuring the whole of one economy in 
terms of another. If the agricultural sector, which chose the exchange rate as a pivot 
reference for the calculation of compensatory amounts, exhibits a different trend from 
the economy as a whole, there can be no alternative to the use of green rates. The second 
mistake was a violation of the principle of free (non-subsidized) movement of goods. In 
actual fact, whilst guaranteeing farmers' incomes, the prices in green rates should 
always be lower than the scale of correction (e.g. subsidy in Germany- tax in Italy) in 
order to guide farmers gradually towards the same level of productivity and the same 
standard of living with an equal quality of product whilst reducing monetary compensa-
tory amounts from the outset. Instead of that, the disparities have been maintained. 
One of the major weaknesses of the EMS lies in the uncertainty which exists as to the 
future credibility of the ECU. To the extent that the ECU becomes credible, it could at 
least become more of a European reserve currency than the dollar and possibly even be 
used in dealings with major trading partners. This matter must, however, be seen from a 
realistic point of view. 
History has shown that in this field the credibility which those who manage the national 
reserves attach to certain currencies or assets is based on a form of hierarchy whereby 
priority is given to what the whole world regards as being de facto the safest vehicle. 
Bankers are not interested in artificial arrangements. 
- The first such vehicle was gold in the form of the Gold Exchange Standard. 
- Then it was the currency of the most powerful trading power, the British Empire. 
- Subsequently, the currency of the new most powerful trading nation, the USA, 
backed by its convertibility into gold. 
- After the demise of Bretton Woods on 15 August 1971, and despite the non-
convertibility of the dollar into gold and its depreciation, it remained gold and the 
currency of the most powerful trading nations. In fact, the loans made by Germany and 
Switzerland to Italy are gauged on the latter's gold. The central banks retain and revalue 
their gold. Despite accounting losses, reserves in dollars increase with all the central 
banks. 
- The SOR, which closely resembles the ECU, is not accepted as a major reserve 
currency basically because it does not present a sole credible signature - a banker's 
argument. 
- Lastly, the gradual rise of Japan and Germany as economic powers comparable with 
the USA has meant that their currencies have also become reserve currencies, albeit 
under duress. 
- Consequently, where the ECU is concerned, it is in noway certain that it will be readily 
accepted as a reserve currency, even by the Europeans. Moreover, the best proof of this 
is the fact that the traditional Belgian talent for compromise had to be called on in order 
to gain acceptance for an arrangement whereby at least 50% of balances would be 
settled in ECU. 
Another uncertainty lies in the future role of the ECU as a reserve currency. Since the 
Europeans do not want the ECU to compete with the dollar, the ECU would remain a 
reserve currency between the European countries until such time as it became the sole 
European currency. On the other hand, Robert Triffin, a leading economist of Belgian 
origin lecturing in the United States and an adviser to the US government, fears that the 
ECU could well compete with the dollar and provoke a serious depreciation in the dollar 
on the world exchange markets. He therefore supports the European idea of not allowing 
the ECU to be used as a reserve currency in other countries. 
The final great weakness lies in the fact that the exchange market might remain as 
fragmented as it is already, or even deteriorate further. We have already seen the Irish 
pound become untied from sterling. Are we shortly to see the Luxembourg franc become 
untied from the Belgian franc? Such fragmentation encourages exploitation of the 
system's weaknesses, to which speculation, data-processing techniques and informa-
tion systems are major contributors. 
Contrary to the image projected by the media, speculators are not, generally speaking, 
large enterprises or individuals intent upon making easy profit from the technical defects 
of the exchange market. Clearly, there are exceptions in both banks and corn panies, just 
as there are corrupt officials and politicians, unfaithful husbands, shady accountants, 
etc ... 
It is fair comment to say that if economic policies were orthodox, the exchange market 
would not be disturbed. Unfortunately, because of the lack of economic stabi1ity, foreign 
currencies have developed into commodities, almost like raw materials, subject to al I the 
vicissitudes of supply and demand. 
Under these circumstances, it is quite logical that, when faced with such uncertainties, 
t commercial enterprises should take precautionary measures in order to safeguard their 
interests. Faced with the disorderly economic trends of different countries, those in 
charge of finance are constrained to speed up or delay payments, purchase foreign 
currency at spot or forward rates, place liquid assets in one or another more stable 
• currency, etc ... Obviously, they judge the firmness of a given currency by the type of 
economic policy applied. 
It therefore stands to reason that insofar as it will be the product of a greater degree of 
economic cohesion, the introduction of the ECU will mean that companies will have less 
need to take precautions against instability. It should be pointed out that the ECU is not 
indispensable to stability. In a situation of stability, Bretton Woods or the snake would be 
equally effective. 
Data-processing has unfortunately added greatly to speculate mechanisms. Two parti-
cular techniques - the mathematical models of arbitrage and the SWIFT network -
have much to answer for in this respect. A brief technical explanation of these mecha-
nisms is provided in the annex. 
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2. APPRAISAL AFTER TWO YEARS' EXPERIENCE 
2.1. Overall appraisal 
During the two years' experience of the EMS, the world economic system has faced an 
upheaval due to the leap in oil prices, the resurgence of inflation and the spectacular 
deterioration in balances of payment, to the point where the International Monetary Fund 
(IMS) is confronted with a fundamental problem of financing the imbalances of virtually 
all its members. 
The EMS has not only survived the upheaval, it has retained all its members and nothing 
has been changed in its essent'ial characteristics. The integrity of the EMS after two 
years' operation now gives it a credibility which the ,,snake" of 1972 never succeeded in 
achieving. 
In his Paper to the Conference on ,,European Banking" organized by the Financial Times 
on 10 December 1980, Mr Ortoli expressed himself in these terms: { 
,,As a whole the system has operated perfectly satisfactorily. 
A. The participating currencies have been stable: from September 1979 to September 
1980 their variations with respect to the ECU have been limited, if one disregards the£, 
whereas the fluctuations of the$ and the Yen with respect to the ECU in the same period 
were 2.5 and 5 times greater respectively than those of the EMS currencies. 
B. The mechanisms have been satisfactory: 
- the movement of the divergence indicator led the monetary authorities, in addition to 
the interventions and before the pivot rates were changed, to resort to the range of 
measures provided for in the Brussels resolution ; 
- the two minor realignments of 24 September and 30 November 1979 took place 
satisfactorily ; 
~ the ii:,terventions in Community currencies increased, even though they are still 
below those carried out in dollars (about 25% of the total in the most recent period). 
C. It must also be noted that the system benefitted from favourable factors which limited 
its internal tensions. From the beginning it involved an element of flexibility linked with 
the level at which the currencies had been introduced into the exchange mechanism, 
with the existence of the normal margin of 2.25% and with that of the margin of 6% 
applicable to the lira. The OM on the other hand, because of the turn-round in the 
German current account balance of payments and the level of interest rates, has not 
pulled the system upwards. 
Finally, the desire of the authorities to make a success ofthesystem and thus to maintain • 
the rates has probably brought about a change in behaviour on the exchange markets. In 
this sense the stability which has been found over two years is almost as much the 
result of the psychological effect produced by the existence of the system as of the tech-
nicalities of its operation. , 
D. This stability is all the more remarkable because, since the beginning of 1979, events 
have occurred which might have been expected to exert a greater pressure than actually 
was the case : 
- the successive increases in the price of oil since June 1979 have produced a con-
siderable imbalance in the Community's balances of payments (more than 40,000 m$) ; 
- the average rate of inflation in the Community has increased more rapidly, but the 
difference between the different national rates has tended to widen; 
- the other major currencies, the Yen and the Dollar, have fluctuated widely ; 
- finally, the volume of international liquidities has increased substantially, which has 
further aggravated the vulnerability of the exchange policies". 
2.2. The EMS and the major economic parameters 
When one analyzes the changes in the major economic parameters of the Member 
countries and the United States since 1 January 1979 up to the present day, it is striking 
to note the considerable differences between countries and, on the other hand, the 
stability of the European currencies with respect to each other. 
A number of figures which speak for themselves are given on the next page. 
As one can see, the considerable differences in the development of the economies of 
the Member Countries have not prevented currency stability, thanks to all the EMS 
machinery which has been set up. 
2.3. Lessons to be drawn 
Although it is very difficult to draw conclusions shared by the spectators and the actors 
- whether they are political or monetary authorities- it is worth making the attempt. 
2.3.1. Positive aspects 
The divergence index is useful and even plays an unexpected role. This device was not 
really necessary for the central banks since it can hardly be claimed that it reveals to the 
monetary authorities a situation which they would not otherwise perceive, since the 
exchange market and the balance of payments of their countries form part of their daily 
business. 
On the other hand, for the political authorities and the public at large it forms a sort of 
signal showing the position of the country as compared with the other members at any 
one time. Because of its psychological effect, the central banks tend to intervene before 
their currency reaches the threshold of± 75, above which the country is obliged to take 
measures to rectify the situation. 
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B D DK 
Inflation 1979 Min. 3,7 2,8 6,7 
(change on corresponding Max. 5,2 5,4 12,8 
month of previous 1980 Min. 6,0 5,0 10,5 
year) Max. 7,6 6,0 14,3 
National 1981 Min. 7,0 5,5 10,6 
sources 1• Quarter Max. 7,6 5,7 11,3 
Budget deficit 1979 9,4 3,0 0,9 
as% of GDP 1980 11,8 3,3 1,3 
Current balance of 1979 - 2,8 - 0,7 - 4,6 
payments deficit (1) 
as% of GDP 1980 - 4,8 - 2,1 - 4,4 
(1) 
Interest rates 1979 Min. 7,69 3,18 9,37 
interbank 3-month Max. 14,75 9,12 22,75 
rates (2) 1980 Min. 12,06 8,06 13,50 
Max. 17,81 10,37 21,68 
1981 Min. 12,13 8,87 11,25 
1• Quarter Max. 17,00 14,50 15,06 
Avarage working 1979 (April) 37,1 41,9 n.b. 
hours 
in industry 1980 (April) n.b. n.b. n.b. 
Source : Eurostat 
Unemployment rate 1979 Min. 7,8 2,9 4,4 
as % of working Max. 9,5 4,6 7,0 
population 1980 Min. 8,3 3,0 5,1 
Source: Eurostat Max. 10,5 4,0 8,5 
1981 Min. 10,5 4,7 9,3 
1• Quarter Max. 10,6 5,1 9,4 
(3) 
Divergence index 1979 Min. +20 -48 -78 
in relation (4) Max. +92 +44 +83 
to ECU 1980 Min. + 4 -11 -42 
Max. +78 +69 +51 
1981 Min. +42 -39 -35 
1• Quarter Max. +96 +67 +41 
(1) B.L.E.U. 
(2) Eurocurrency 3-month rates, bar Belgium. Source : B.R.I. 
(3) Bar USA: 2 preceding months. 
(4) Since 13 March 1979. 
F 
10, 1 
11,8 
13,0 
13,8 
12,5 
12,8 
0,8 
0,7 
+ 0,2 
- 1,2 
7,50 
14,62 
10,31 
14,37 
10,50 
14,37 
41,1 
40,8 
5,7 
6,6 
5,9 
7,3 
7,4 
7,5 
-43 
+51 
-72 
- 6 
-74 
-12 
• 23.3.1981 Devaluation of 6 pet. against the currencies of the EMS. 
n.b. = not available. 
IRL NL VK USA 
13,0 10,8 3,8 9,3 9,4 
19,8 16,0 4,8 17,4 13,3 
20,4 15,6 5,5 15,3 12,7 
21,7 20,3 7, 1 21,9 14,6 
19,8 20,9 6,5 12,5 10,3 
20,6 20,9 6,9 13,0 11,5 
9,4 n.b. 5,6 3,3 n.b. 
10,7 n.b. 5,9 3,0 n.b. 
+ 1,6 - 8,7 - 1,6 - 1,0 
- 1,3 - 5,1 - 1,8 + 0,9 + 0,2 
11,00 n.b. 6,31 11, 12 10,25 
19,75 n.b. 15,50 17,00 15,81 
15,25 n.b. 9,12 13,75 8,75 
32,62 n.b. 12,87 19,62 22,00 
16,50 n.b. 9,06 11,62 13,81 
20,25 n.b. 11,50 14,50 19,06 
n.b. 42,3 41,0 n.b. 40,2 
n.b. 41,2 n.b. n.b. 39,8 
7,0 7,3 3,7 5,0 5,2 
8,0 9,0 4,8 5,6 6,4 
7,6 8,1 4,0 5,6 6,6 
8,3 10,2 6,3 8,6 8,2 
8,8 10,4 6,7 9,3 8,0 
8,9 10,5 6,8 9,5 8,2 
-38 -45 -30 
+13 +47 +62 
- 5 -44 -64 
+60 +48 +22 
+ 3 - 7 -56 
+76· +72 - 4 
The credit facilities have not been used to any great extent by comparison with the means 
provided for by the EMS. This is partly due to the fact that all the member countries have a 
balance of payments deficit with respect to the world economy. It is therefore difficult to 
resort to internal financing of deficit balances. 
The political will to make the EMS work is perhaps the most striking positive aspect, in 
spite of the complex situation of the relationship between the OM and the dollar. In the 
,,snake" the OM had a tendency to increase the upward pressures when the dollar was 
strong. Despite the fact that the United States persists in using monetary techniques -
interest rate and money supply- to control its inflation, the OM has not followed the 
movements of the dollar. On the contrary, because of the substantial German balance of 
payments deficit, the OM has been amongst the weak currencies. 
2.3.2. Negative aspects 
The considerable differences in the major economic parameters constitute the greatest 
danger. If the differences in economic development are too great, the tensions with in the 
EMS will increase and, as long as a country can do so, it will leave the EMS or revaluate or 
devaluate substantially within the EMS. 
To illustrate the dangers, here are a few examples of countries meriting particular 
attention. 
Belgium is paralyzed by an astonishing degree of indecision regarding the rectification 
of its budget deficit. As the Luxembourg Prime Minister, Mr Werner, remarked in general 
terms in his statement of 15 December 1980, economic and monetary convergence 
assumes amongst other things that the most orthodox views on monetary doctrine will 
be respected. In this respect the injection of money to finance the budget deficit should 
be an exceptional, instantaneous and controlled measure (7). From this point of view, 
Belgium may interfere with the harmonious development of the EMS. 
The United Kingdom, for its part, is not succeeding in controlling inflation. While its 
external situation is good and for the time being prevents the deterioration in its cur-
rency, it is because of its favourable energy balance, reinforced by a high oil price, but 
mainly because of a considerable reduction in the purchasing power of the British 
worker. Since it does not belong to the EMS, it does not present a direct danger to the 
system, but its persistent non-integration, mainly for economic reasons, does not streng-
then the EMS and indirectly jeopardizes its future. 
Finally, because of its grave economic weakness, Denmark was one of the reasons for 
tension within the EMS in September and November 1979. 
These few instances show that if there is no convergence of economic policies, monetary 
convergence becomes more difficult. 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
3.1. At technical level 
Compared with the technical analysis, the impression is that this examination goes 
either too far or not far enough. 
The conditions of strict economic management needed to guarantee success do not 
appear to be present. Several important aspects diverge, e.g. VAT rates, taxation poli-
cies, inflation rates, wage costs, working hours, etc ... Would it not have been better first 
of all to reduce the gap between the various important economic policy parameters and 
thus stabilize the exchange rates between the European currencies? It would then have 
simply been a matter of plucking the ripened fruit instead of trying to ripen it artificially as 
is the case now. 
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The other alternative, which might seem more daring but is in actual fact more realistic, 
would have been to decide straight away on the creation of a European currency without 
any period of transition. In this way, the various countries would have been welded 
together without any possible means of escape (8) and forced into a process of mutual 
adjustment. 
In some sectors, temporary support measures would probably have to be taken, the 
extent of which would gradually diminish. In this connection, it should be noted that the 
solution which has been implemented in the iron and steel sector does not rely on a 
monetary technique but on industrial management and, in the long run, will have the 
same effect as the scrapping of outdated technology. Th is solution leaves plenty of room 
for the rapprochement of the European currencies without jeopardizing the reorganiza-
tion of the steel sector. Thus, the straightforward creation of a European currency 
without transition (accelerated Werner Plan) is a viable proposition from both the 
technical and economic points of view. 
3.2. At the political level 
All the studies carried out by the experts and the central banks over more than 10 years-
the Werner plan is the most striking example - show that monetary and economic 
integration is technically possible provided the political will is there. The officials of the 
central banks often have the feeling that studies and memoranda have been requested 
by the political authorities so that they would not have to make a decision. 
In Luxemburg on 1 and 2 December 1980, the European Council did not ratify the 
formal undertaking of the Council of Bremen on 6 and 7 July 1978 or that of Brussels on 
5 December 1978, which maintained ,,their firm determination to consolidate, no later 
than two years after the establishment of the system, the provisions and procedures 
thus established in order to make it a definitive system. As provided for in the conclu-
sions of the meeting of the European Council in Bremen on 6 and 7 July 1978, this system 
will involve the creation of the European Monetary Fund and will mean the full and total 
use of the ECU as a reserve asset and instrument of control". 
Has not the moment come for the directly-elected representatives of the European 
People to demonstrate clearly the will to persevere towards European integration, as 
expressed on two occasions by the Council, and thus stimulate the implementation of 
the resolution of 10 January 1979 by the EPP on the EMS, the final sentence of which 
states that : ,,the EMS is a decisive stage in the achievement of economic and monetary 
union on the way to European union". 
In orderforthis stage to be decisive there MUST be a minimum degree of irreversibility as 
provided for on the creation of the EMS. 
Although this has not yet been tackled, but is an underlying factor in monetary unifica-
tion, as Mr Werner also pointed out in his 1971 report, the creation of a single European 
fiduciary currency, with notes and coins, will be for the public at large the visible 
evidence of integration. 
Having regard to the very long process involved in the design, production and distribu-
tion of a European currency (minimum 5 years), the process of creation of such a 
currency ought to be initiated. To give concrete form to these ideas and as a conclusion 
to this report, it is suggested in particular, without excluding other possibilities for 
action, that the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democratic Group) 
should table in the European Parliament a resolution on action to be taken in the 
monetary sector with a view to European monetary unification. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. ECDU and EPP resolution on EMS of 10 January 1979. 
2. The International Role and Fate of the Dollar, by Robert Triffin - in Foreign Affairs, Winter 
1978/79, page 276. 
,,It explains also the desperate attempt of the Europeans to set up a new European Monetary Syst&m 
less overwhelmingly dependent on an inconvertible, fluctuating, and shrinking dollar for their own 
international settlements and accumulation of official reserves and private working balances". 
3. National Bank of Belgium report for 1978 - part of the introduction on floating rates 
(page XXII). 
,,The fact remains that the international order of Bretton Woods has given way to a state of chaos in 
which each country can decide, far too freely, to progress from floating to the precarious stabiliza-
tion of the exchange rates for its currency or vice versa". 
4. The International Role and Fate of the Dollar, by Robert Triffin - Foreign Affairs, Winter 
1978/79, page 27 4. 
,,The floating exchange-rate system that succeeded the Bretton Woods agreement has become 
more and more unacceptable to many countries". 
5. National Bank of Belgium report for 1978 - Introduction pages XXIV and XXV. 
,,If, once it is achieved, this ambitious project is to last, the operation of this vast area of fixed 
exchange rates will have to be buttressed by economic policies characterized by willingness to 
subordinate national measures to the Community interest. Admittedly, economic trends will never 
progress fully in step within the Community and it is perhaps better that way. There is no doubt 
therefore that temporary imbalances wi II disturb the national exchange markets ; when they are the 
result of economic or accidental variables, it is appropriate that they should be financed rather than 
fought. However, it is just as obvious that if the economic policies of the countries of the Community 
were to differ fundamentally from each other for too long, both in inspiration and in terms of their 
objectives, and if the exchange policies with respect to floating currencies were to contradict each 
other, the internal or external values of the partners" currencies could never progress in any but an 
incohesive manner; the monetary stability area would be stable in name only. 
,,This necessary cohesion of policies will only be properly achieved when these policies are 
determined in the different countries by politicians who have to answer for their decisions first and 
foremost to the national authorities and, in particular, the national electorates. In the last analysis, 
the technical arrangements which can be made to promote the monetary unification of Europe are 
merely means of aspiring to broader, more fundamental and longer-term targets. Such targets can 
be set and reached only with the clearly-expressed and constantly renewed consensus of the 
highest political authorities of the autonomous states. This means that the deliberate introduction 
by the European Council of a coordinated monetary system as a recognizedly necessary catalyst for 
European integration logically postulates a desire on the part of these authorities for rapproche-
ment, the pre-requisite for any form of political union between the countries of the Community". 
6. Societe Generale de Banque Monthly Review---' February 1979 - No. 185 - page 1. 
,,The reason put forward for postponing the entry into force of the EMS is a regrettable pretext from 
both the political and the psychological point of view. It is to be hoped that this incident will not 
cause a major crisis within the EEC, but it can only increase the scepticism of those circles which 
have doubts as to the sincerity of the political will to achieve European union and which deplore the 
fact that nationalism is as strong as ever, despite the Common Market having been created more 
than 20 years ago. Some countries have taken definite risks on the internal political level to join the 
EMS and have received no recognition for this whatsoever". 
7. The future of our currencies- Speech given by Mr Pierre Werner, Head of Government, to the 
Centre d'Accueil pour l'Europe Unie" 15 December 1980, pages 7 and 8. 
,,On the other hand financing budgets by monetary operations is regarded in most countries as 
impossible, abnormal or only justified in temporary, exceptional crises. Granted, the Keynesians 
have modified this view slightly. Increasing the money supply, for example via the budget, is a form 
of stimulus and guidance which is widely used according to the circumstances prevailing. 
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Any new approach to monetary union also presupposes some success in reaching a sufficient 
degrne of harmonization of the economic criteria and justification for increasing the money supply 
while the methods adopted to achieve the desired results could vary. A basic feature of any 
agreement on this point would be to rule out or severely restrict the financing of budgets and public 
programmes by means of monetary operations. Of course, it is not enough to keep the money 
supply under control solely in relation to the financing of public expenditure. This must be accom-
panied by controls on the volume of monetary flows as the result of banking activities. 
Liquidity policy represents an integrated whole which should correspond to the overall needs of the 
economy. I remain convinced, however, that it is first and foremost the task of the public sector to 
prevent inflationary financing. Thus the neutrality of public sector operations on the money supply 
woutd be one of the principles on which the Member States would have to agree although this 
principle might be subject to certain clearly-defined exceptions according to the state of the 
economy". 
8. Tijdschrift voor economie en management - Katholieke Universiteit Leuven - XXlst year -
No. 1 - 1976 - page 99. 
,,As a rule, the transition from national currencies to a single European currency is seen only as a 
final goal, more recent proposals advocating the introduction of a parallel European currency in the 
initial stages. A European currency would imply irrevocably fixed exchange rates and a harmonized 
monetary policy and would consolidate the European identity". 
ANNEX 
Mathematical arbitrage models optimize the profits to be made on an arbitrage transact-
ion from one currency to another via third currencies by using not only spot and forward 
transactions but also deposits in the currencies in the chain discovered by the computer. 
The computer runs through its model several thousand times a day and as soon as it 
identifies potentially profitable transactions, informs the exchange dealers, who then 
seek confirmation from the correspondent banks concerned. In the space of a few 
minutes, i.e. the time to make ten or so telephone calls, the bank sets up a chain 
throughout the world and then starts all over again. 
In this connection, the EMS or the ECU will have the effect of reducing de facto the 
number of random variables of the mathematical model and thus of reducing the 
chances of identifying profitable transactions. At present, some twenty currencies take 
part in this game but as the Scandinavian currencies, the Swiss Franc and the currencies 
of future member countries of the Common Market gradually join the EMS, this number 
wi 11 fal I to between 12 and 8. 
SWIFT is an automatic network linking the terminals of the exchange and arbitrage 
departments or even the computers of the 400 most important commercial banks in 
Europe, America and Asia for the purpose of speeding up payments. 
In this way, each of the 360,000 payments a day totalling many thousands of millions of 
dollars is executed within a few minutes. The payment is processed, the accounts are 
adjusted and new decisions are taken. Less than five years ago, this whole process took 
anything up to two days. The speed at which money rotates has increased considerably, 
exacerbating any disturbing effects. There is no doubt that if the ECU stabilizes 8 to 12 
currencies, the exacerbating effect of the SWIFT network will diminish accordingly. 
Lastly, it must be admitted that the mushrooming of information systems in the exchange 
field is making objective assessment increasingly difficult. 
The all-powerful British press agency, Reuter, offers an exceptional service in this field, 
to which almost all the commercial and central banks are subscribers. Starting from 
several centres - London, Frankfurt and New York - Reuter has set up a network of 
terminals delivering every political, economic, monetary and military message straight to 
the exchange dealers like starting signals in a race. 
In addition, Reuter calculates the parities between currencies on the various markets 
and tomorrow, if the EMS becomes operational, will calculate the position of the differ-
ent currencies against the ECU and will probably issue a graph showing the situation of 
each currency together with its position in relation to its i~tervention rate and its 
fluctuation indicator. 
The central banks wil I al most have to be able to anticipate the reactions of the market so 
as to prevent the latter from demolishing the whole structure. 
29 
30 
EUROPEAN 
REGIONAL 
POLICY 
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The Political Bureau of the European People's Party (EPP), meeting in Brussels on 1st 
July 1981 under the chairmanship of Leo Tindemans, unanimously adopted the follo-
wing statement. 
Statement by the 
European People's Party (EPP) 
on a 
Mediterranean plan 
for the 
European Community 
Rapporteurs : 
Gianfranco Martini 
Hans August Lucker 
At several points in the EPP's Political Programme (March 1978) it is stated that Euro-
pea111 unification must be an effective instrument if it is to meet the challenge of under-
development both internally and in other countries. 
The Christian Democrats must devote their entire energies to this task, in order to help 
build a more just society. The problems dividing social groups, regions and countries in 
Europe can only be solved by a policy of European solidarity and structural change. 
In its policy, the Community must combat unfair regional and social disparities, rather 
than simply react to their consequences. 
Economic development is not an end in itself. It is there to serve Man. 
1. In saying this the EPP's programme follows from the conclusions of the ECDU 
Conference on European Regional Policy held in Munich on 28/30 June 1973. In its final 
statement the Conference (comprising Members of Parliament, regional and local repre-
sentatives and experts) called for the creation without delay of a true and effective 
Community regional policy based on a common budgetary and financial policy, as part 
of a political and institutional strengthening of the Community. On 18 March 1975 the 
Regional Development Fund of the European Community was set up. 
2. Such a policy will of course always call for progress on European integration. But the 
present socio-economic situation, in which the less-developed regions of the Commu-
nity are more severely affected and which have further aggravated the problems of 
restructuring and retraining, makes it all the more urgent. All sectors are now permeated 
by unemployment while certain categories (young people and women) are especially 
hard hit; the problem is now primarily structural rather than cyclical in nature. 
3. The great challenge represented by the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
and the inadequacy of the regionally oriented financial instruments of the Community 
(ERDF, EAGGF Guidance Section, Social Fund, EIB, ECSC aid) call for a more compre-
hensive and effective structural and regional policy and more money. 
4. The European Parliament's resolution of 15 April 1980 on the Fourth Annual Report 
of the Commission of the European Communities on the European Regional Develop-
ment Fund (ERDF) states that, despite present policies. 
a) the divergence between average per capita incomes in the richer and poorer regions 
of the Community has continued to increase ; 
b) the existence of regional disparities constitutes a threat to the sound operation of the 
common market and the internal cohesion of the Community, and an obstacle to the 
progress of economic and monetary integration and the enlargement of the Com-
munity; 
c) the uncontrolled phenomena of congestion and migration are more costly than 
measures to encourage the balanced development of the regions; 
d) the definition of an overall analytical and conceptual framework constitutes the only 
means of moving gradually to introducing a genuine Community regional policy; 
e) Community aid ought to be paid direct to the public or private investor as a supple-
ment to national aid, as the Member States are using aid granted from the Fund as partial 
repayment of national aid. 
These comments give a good picture of present regional and structural policies and 
demonstrate that, despite the best of intentions, they have not made any breakthrough, 
although about 21,000 m EUA have been spent through these five financial instruments 
of Community regional and structural policy. 
5. We Christian Democrats therefore regard the following points as vital: 
a) the policy of reducing regional imbalances must be an overall and coherent policy 
based on Community criteria covering all related policies, a concept whose structural 
effect cannot be attained through piecemeal (often concurrent) measures; 
b) its fundamental object must beto provide work and adequate living conditions for the 
population in the regions where they live ; 
c) the Community's resources to carry out this policy must be increased and made more 
effective. 
6. A comprehensive and radical policy of this kind will only be successful if it produces 
direct action and if its aims, instruments and procedures are defined and implemented 
on a long-term (15-20 years) basis. A revolving fund should be set up as its key in-
strumen.t, along the lines of the Marshall Plan. 
The fund would: 
a) be replenished from the circulation of its funds- revenue from interest, repayments ; 
b) work on the principle of shared finance, i.e. own resources and outside capital should 
be used in suitable proportions; 
c) its interest rates shall be fixed according to the purpose of the loans, lower than 
market rates and not index-linked ; 
d) the duration of loans should be tailored to their purpose. Redemption-free years 
should normally be allowed as appropriate; 
e) the fund should be aimed primarily at the Mediterranean regions of Italy and France, 
and at Greece, Portugal and Spain, in order to alleviate excessive economic imbalances; 
f) in view of the extent and urgency of the problems facing us, the endowment of the 
fund must be at least 1 % of the Community's GDP (about 15,000 m ECU). Over the 
next 6 to 8 years the fund should be built up to this figure via the Community budget, 
which must be increased accordingly; 
g) the fund should be used on the basis of Commission directives and administered by 
the European Investment Bank as an independent unit ; 
h) the fund should be subject to control by the European Parliament ; 
i) the activities of the fund under the Mediterranean Plan should dovetail with the 
Community's traditional regional policy for those regions of the Community not covered 
by the Mediterranean Plan. 
7. However, this policy cannot be brought to fruition if the Community is not atthe same 
time politically and institutionally strengthened. Without a European central decision-
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making body for Europe answerable to the European Parliament, and without a return to 
majority voting in the Council as laid down in the Treaty, no policy can be successful in 
this important area, and without that there can be no economic and monetary union. 
8. There can be no bypassing the regional and local authorities when development 
policy (infrastructure, social and cultural facilities, community services, coordination of 
measures, regional planning, etc ... ), is being drawn up and executed. It is therefore 
essential that they be suit ably involved in the planning and implementation of this policy, 
and be allowed to make useful contact with the fund administration. 
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